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Abstract
The increase in debt-free or under-levered firms (financial conservatism) is one of
the most recent stylised puzzles that cannot be explained within the context of ex-
tant capital structure theories. In this paper, we exploit the 2008–09 contractions in
credit supply in a quasi-natural experiment to examine whether financial conser-
vatism affects firm value. Using a large sample of firms from seven African countries
over the period 2003–2012, we find strong evidence that financial conservatism mit-
igates the adverse effect of contractions in credit supply on firm value for both local
and international firms. Our results suggest that financial conservatism is an ef-
fective strategy for managing risks arising from contractions in credit supply and
international business exposure. These findings provide novel empirical evidence on
the value relevance of financial conservatism which shields firms from the adverse
and far-reaching effects of contractions in credit supply.
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1 Introduction
One of the most recent stylised puzzles in corporate finance is the increase in debt-free
or under-levered (financial conservatism, thereon) firms which is contrary to predictions
of the main capital structure theories. The trend implies that firms are increasingly
forgoing the benefits associated with debt finance such as interest tax shield, lower costs
of capital, and the disciplinary role of debt (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Bessler et al.,
2013; Bigelli et al., 2014). This puzzling phenomenon has motivated several studies on
the determinants of financial conservatism. For example, Bigelli et al. (2014) show that
financial conservatism is more pronounced in smaller firms and firms with low intangible
assets and effective tax rates. Bessler et al. (2013) also report that financial conservatism
is higher in common law countries, countries with higher creditor protection, and in
jurisdictions with dividend relief tax systems. Notwithstanding the contributions of these
papers, it remains unclear whether financial conservatism has any financial benefit or cost,
especially during periods of heightened uncertainty and contractions in credit supply such
as the global financial crisis. In this paper, we address the above research gap and provide
new insights on whether financial conservatism enhances or preserves firm value during
the 2008–09 credit supply shock within the context of emerging markets.
The effects of the global financial crisis (GFC) are still being felt, and much is yet to be
understood about how and why it affected some economic agents more than others at firm,
industry and country level (Anginer and Demirguc-Kunt, 2014; Dawood et al., 2017).1
Our study sheds light on the above research question and is important for two main rea-
sons. First, as the link between financing and real decisions is contentious, the 2008–09
exogenous credit supply shock provides a rare and unique quasi-natural experiment set-
1Several studies report contradictory results on the effects of the GFC on corporate decisions. For
example, Duchin et al. (2010) and Almeida et al. (2011) find that the crisis had a significant adverse
effect on corporate investment. However, Kahle and Stulz (2013) find no significant differences between
non-bank-dependent and bank-dependent firms of the effect of the crisis on debt issuance and capital
expenditure.
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ting that enables us to examine this issue directly.2 Second, the 2008–09 contraction in
credit supply offers an opportunity to examine how economic shocks originating in devel-
oped countries propagate and affect firms in less integrated and understudied emerging
economies. This is of particular importance as there is a general consensus that the effects
of the GFC vary in both intensity and duration with the level of economic integration
(Allen and Giovannetti, 2011; Berman and Martin, 2012; Duygun et al., 2016). By focus-
ing on the GFC, we provide direct empirical evidence on the adverse effects of the crisis
across emerging economies and whether these are moderated by financing structures.
Using a large sample of publicly listed African firms, we examine the effects of financial
conservatism on firm value over the period 2003–2012. We contend that as the GFC was
an unexpected credit supply shock, firms had limited or no time to adjust their financing
policies, hence, our estimates are less likely to be biased by reverse causality. As expected,
we find that the GFC had a significant negative effect on firm value. On average, firm
value decreased by 14%–20% post 2008. This decrease is robust to different definitions of
firm value, the window-period used, and other factors that are known to affect firm value.
However, in our main analysis we find that this negative effect is insignificant and less
pronounced for firms that are financially conservative. This finding is novel as the prior
literature on financial conservatism is rather confined to the examination of the deter-
minants of conservatism and does not investigate when and where it is most beneficial.3
Thus, our results suggest that financial conservatism has several important implications
on firm value in the aftermath of the GFC as it increases resilience to contractions in
credit supply.
We further find that the severity of the 2008–09 contractions in credit supply varies
2The channels through which financing activities affect real decisions are subject to debate (see Stein,
2003; Chava and Roberts, 2008). Since the credit supply shock originated in developed countries (the
US and the UK), it should be orthogonal to African firms and their operating environment. This ought
to reduce concerns of compounding effects (Puri et al., 2011; Popov and Rocholl, 2018).
3For studies that examine the determinants of zero-leverage see Devos et al. (2012), Bessler et al.
(2013), Dang (2013), and El Ghoul et al. (2018).
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across firms and countries as well as over time. Our results show that the panic occurred
earlier in Africa relative to developed countries, with the decrease in firm value peaking
in 2006, and diminishing thereafter. This is inconsistent with the US studies of Almeida
and Campello (2007) and Chava and Purnanandam (2011) that report severe adverse
effects during the 2008–09 period. We further find that firms with international exposure,
through either cross-listing or foreign sales, were more affected than purely domestic
firms and that this effect is moderated by financial conservatism. This implies that
firms with high exposure to international markets can mitigate the associated risks by
adopting conservative financing policies. Our results further show that firms in common
law countries (Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt and Kenya), which are more integrated with
the US and the UK (where the crisis originated), were more affected by the crisis than
those in civil law countries (Morocco, Tunisia and Ivory Coast). Hence, high levels of
economic integration and similar legal systems expose firms in vulnerable countries to
severe credit supply shocks originating from developed economies.
We contribute to the literature in five ways. First, we show that financial conservatism
is beneficial during the 2008–09 contractions in credit supply. This implies that firms with
conservative financial policies, specifically those that are debt-free or unlevered, are better
positioned to manage the adverse effect of credit supply shocks relative to those with less
conservative financial policies. Second, we contend that, as market imperfections are more
apparent in emerging economies, this should result in a pronounced effect of financing
decisions on firm value. In line with this prediction, we find that the adverse effects of
the GFC increase with leverage since financially conservative firms in our context were
less affected relative to non-conservative ones. Third, our results show that economic ties
and international business exposure increase vulnerability to economic shocks, but this
effect diminishes with financial conservatism. Fourth, we find that firms in common law
countries that have closer links to the US and the UK were more adversely affected by
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the GFC, but this is less visible for financially conservative firms. Finally, we show that
firms in African countries that are less integrated and understudied were also adversely
affected by the GFC.4
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the literature
review and hypotheses. In Section 3, we present the methodology used. Section 4 explains
the data and variable construction. Section 5 presents and discusses the empirical results.
Section 6 presents the robustness tests. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature and hypotheses
Our study builds upon four strands of the literature, namely, (1) the effects of contractions
in credit supply on corporate decisions, (2) the nexus between financing and real activities,
(3) the link between internationalisation and corporate outcomes, and (4) the effect of
legal origin on corporate outcomes.
2.1 The global financial crisis, financial conservatism and firm
value
Over the past few decades, the frequency and severity of economic crises have increased.
The majority of these crises have either been country-specific (e.g. Turkish, Argentinian,
and Russian crisis of 2001, 1992-2002 and 2014, respectively) or region-specific (e.g. the
Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s and the 2010 euro-zone crisis). The exception is
the 2008–09 global financial crisis (GFC). As the GFC originated from the US subprime
mortgage market and propagated to other countries (unlike other previous regional or
country-specific crises) it is not surprising that it has motivated considerable research.
However, studies on the effects of the GFC have reported mixed results, with Campello
4This addresses the concentration of studies on the effects of the GFC in the US (Almeida and
Campello, 2007; Chava and Purnanandam, 2011; Kahle and Stulz, 2013).
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et al. (2010), Chava and Purnanandam (2011), Almeida et al. (2012), Udenio et al. (2018)
and Rehman et al. (2019) documenting significant adverse effects on corporate decisions,
while Chari et al. (2008), Lemmon and Roberts (2010), Kahle and Stulz (2013), Caporale
et al. (2018), Zouaghi et al. (2018) and Choudhry et al. (2019) report no or low effects.5
The findings of the latter studies are contrary to the central prediction that firms with
weaker balance sheets are more likely to be credit rationed during periods of heightened
uncertainty (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997). In addition to this lack of consensus in the
literature, there is a dearth of studies that have examined whether firm financial policies
provide a shield or increase exposure to the 2008–09 contractions in credit supply.
We address the above research gap and contribute to the literature by examining
whether conservative financial policies were important in protecting or shielding firms
from the adverse effects of the GFC. Our focus is motivated by the growing interest among
academics in understanding why firms are increasingly adopting conservative financial
policies (zero and low leveraging) (see Devos et al., 2012; Bessler et al., 2013; Dang,
2013; Bigelli et al., 2014). By adopting such policies, firms are implicitly choosing to
forgo the benefits of debt finance, which is inconsistent with the mainstream theories.
While extant studies have investigated the determinants of financial conservatism, the
question of whether financial conservatism is value relevant during contractions in credit
supply is yet to be examined. We contend that unlevered or conservative firms are
less likely to be affected by contractions in credit supply since they are more reliant
on internal and equity financing. Accordingly, they ought to be better positioned to
manage the adverse effects of contractions in credit supply relative to levered firms as
they have prior experience in managing investments without debt financing. This is in
line with economic theories of predation in which firms may voluntarily decide to lower
their leverage to gain a competitive edge and market share during economic slumps (see
5Similarly, Graham and Leary (2011) also concludes that covenant violations during the GFC did not
significantly limit access to further credit as lenders were more willing to renegotiate.
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Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1996). Against this background, we, therefore, formulate and
test the following hypothesis;
Hypothesis 1 (H1) : Financial conservatism enhances firm value during contractions
in credit supply.
2.2 International exposure, legal origin, financial conservatism
and firm value
Globalisation has spurred the movement of firms across national boundaries to increase
market share, profitability and competitive advantage. This has motivated recent re-
search focusing on the interface between international business and finance (see Aggarwal
et al., 2009; Fainshmidt et al., 2018; Areneke and Kimani, 2019). Several extant studies
document that internationalisation has several important benefits to the firm, such as
improvements in corporate practices, profitability and firm value. For example, Juasrikul
et al. (2018) show that international alliances with developed market MNEs (DMMNEs)
enhance the firm value of emerging market multinationals (EMMNEs). Similarly, Hsu
et al. (2013) find that international expansion enhances growth opportunities and access
to cutting-edge technology. However, not much has been done on investigating whether
firm internationalisation increases contagion risks and exposure to international shocks,
and whether financial policies moderate this effect.
We address this lack of research by focusing on the differential effects of the GFC
on cross-listed firms and firms with foreign sales. Firms can achieve internationalisation
through cross-listing in other countries. Drawing on the bonding hypothesis of Coffee
(2002), cross-listing enhances access to external finance and scrutiny as firms bond with
international practices. This improves the competitive edge and the relative performance
of cross-listed firms over domestic firms. As a result, cross-listing enhances firm value
(Coffee, 2002; Charitou and Louca, 2009) and the quality of corporate governance, thus
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improves access to external finance and mitigates agency costs and information asym-
metry problems (see Lel and Miller, 2008; Areneke and Kimani, 2019). However, during
contractions in credit supply, cross-listing is likely to increases susceptibility to interna-
tional shocks. We contend that financing policies can moderate this adverse effect since
cross-listed firms with conservative financial policies are less likely to be affected by credit
supply shocks. This arises because, unlike levered firms, conservative firms are not de-
pendent on debt financing for their survival. Thus, conservative financial policies reduce
or moderate the adverse impact of the contractions in credit supply for cross-listed firms
during the GFC. We, therefore, hypothesise the following:
Hypothesis 2 (H2) : Financial conservatism mitigates the adverse effects of the GFC
on the value of firms with international business exposure through cross-listing.
As not all internationalised firms are cross-listed, we use foreign sales as another proxy
for international business exposure. We posit that during contractions in credit supply,
firms with foreign sales are more likely to be affected by contagion effects as their sales
shrink both domestically and internationally. However, if our first hypothesis (H1) holds,
this severe adverse effect is likely to be moderated by financial conservatism. Financial
conservatism, in this case, increases strategic flexibility, which frees the firm to pursue
other growth prospects or new markets rather than focus entirely on dealing with debt-
overhang issues (which affect levered firms) triggered by the contraction in credit supply.
Against this background, we formulate and test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (H3) : Financial conservatism mitigates the adverse effects of the GFC
on the value of firms with foreign sales.
Finally, the legal origin of countries ensures strong ties in policies and governance
systems such as property rights and investors protection (La Porta et al., 1997, 2006). As
noted earlier, Bessler et al. (2013) show that countries with high creditor protection and
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common law systems have the highest number of financially conservative firms. Drawing
on this finding, we conjecture that legal origin ensures complementariness and strong
ties with countries that have similar systems. While these ties are beneficial, they also
constitute another channel that can aid in the transmission of economic shocks to other
countries. As the 2008–09 credit supply shock originated in the US and the UK, we
expect firms in common law countries to have been more affected relative to those in
civil law systems. Accordingly, we test whether financial conservatism (if H1 holds) is
more value relevant to firms in countries that have stronger ties with the US and the UK
(common law countries) where the credit supply shock originated. We, thus, hypothesise
the following:
Hypothesis 4 (H4) : The mitigating role of financial conservatism on firm value during
the GFC is more pronounced for firms in countries with common law legal systems.
3 Methodology
To examine the effects of financial conservatism on firm value, we estimate the following
model:
yijt =α + γ1Crisist + γ2Crisist × FCi + βX ijt−1 + ηj + ηt + ijt (1)
where yijt is the value of firm i in country j at time t; γ1, γ2, and β are coefficients to be
estimated; Crisist is a dummy that takes the value of one over the period 2008–2012 and
zero otherwise; FCi is a dummy that takes the value of one for financially conservative
firms and zero otherwise; X ijt−1 is a vector of firm-specific characteristics explained below;
ηj and ηt are the country and time fixed effects; and ijt is the error term. As financial
conservatism (FCi) is time-invariant, the coefficient of FCi in Equation (1) is absorbed by
the firm-fixed effect. For robustness, we use several definitions of financial conservatism
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(FCi), namely: zero leverage (ZL) for firms without debt, almost-zero leverage (AZL)
for firms with less than 1% debt, and ultra-low leverage (UL) for firms with less than
5% debt. Our measures of financial conservatism are based on the pre-crisis period to
avoid the possible compounding effects of the credit shock on financing decisions (see
Angrist and Pischke, 2008). The vector X ijt−1 consists of return on assets (ROA), sales
growth (SG), cash and cash equivalents (Cash), property, plant and equipment (PPE),
size (Size), and the median of the dependent variable.6
To investigate the variations of the effect of leverage on firm value, we next estimate
a modified version of Equation (1) that includes three leverage dummies (D2ijct−D4ijct)
as follows:-
yijt =α +
4∑
k=2
λkDk ijt + γ1Crisist +
4∑
k=2
λ′kDk ijt × Crisist
+ βX ijt−1 + ηj + ηt + ijt (2)
where
∑4
k=2 βkDk ijct is a vector of financing (leverage) policies defined below with slope
coefficients from λ2 to λ4. D1ijt (low-leverage), D2ijt (low-medium leverage), D3ijt
(medium-high leverage) and D4ijt (high-leverage) are dummy variables that take the
value of one and otherwise zero if firm i in industry j at time t is categorised as following
one of the four leverage policies. For example, D1ijt is equal to one if a firm is categorised
in the first quantile of the leverage level and otherwise zero. We drop D1ijt (low-leverage)
to avoid the dummy variable trap. To deal with unobserved heterogeneity, we include
firm, country and time-fixed effects in all regressions and report standard errors that are
clustered at firm-level.
6The choice of firm-specific factors is informed by the literature (e.g., Fama and French, 1998; Gamba
and Triantis, 2008; Kim et al., 2016).
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4 Data
Our sample consists of publicly listed firms extracted from Thomson Reuters Datastream
over the period 2003–2012. As is standard in the literature, we exclude firms in the
financial and utility sectors, those with missing data on key variables, and firms with
more than 100% growth in assets or sales (see Baek et al., 2004; Enikolopov et al., 2014).
We only retain firms that have at least one observation in both the pre-crisis (2003–2007)
and the crisis periods (2008–2012). All variables used are winsorised at the lower and
upper one percentile. Our final unbalanced sample consists of 5,320 firm-year observations
(901 firms) from seven African countries (Egypt, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria,
South Africa and Tunisia). All variables used are defined in Table 1.
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for all the variables. Panel A, for the main
variables, show an overall mean (standard deviation) of 1.578 (0.818), 2.248 (1.723) and
0.226 (0.0.574) for firm value (Q), market value-to-equity (MVE) and total shareholder re-
turn (TSR), respectively. These summary statistics are in line with the literature.7 Com-
parisons of the periods 2003–2007 and 2008–2012 suggest that the GFC had a significant
negative effect on firm value (Q), market value-to-equity (MVE) and total shareholder re-
turn (TSR). The changes for the other firm-specific factors around the GFC period are not
significant and less pronounced, except for return-on-assets (ROA) and size (Size). Panel
B presents the difference in firm value between the period 2003–2007 and 2008–2012, and
across non-financially conservative (Non-FC) and financially conservative (ZL, AZL, and
UL) firms. The results show that the value of financially conservative firms decreased less
than that for non-financially conservative firms. This significant and more pronounced
7See Ojah and Pillay (2009), Agyei-Boapeah and Machokoto (2018) and Machokoto et al. (2020).
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decrease in value for non-financially conservative firms (Non-FCs) is consistent across
different measures of firm value, namely market-value-to-equity (MVE) and total share-
holder return (TSR). These differences are consistent with our main hypothesis (H1) and
show a priori that conservative financial policies reduce the adverse effects of the GFC
on firm value.
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Figure 1 plots firm value for the four quantiles of firms categorised by leverage. Figure
1a shows that firm value decreases with leverage and, more importantly, it is higher in
the pre-crisis period (2003–2007) than in the crisis-period (2008–2012) across all leverage
quantiles. In Figure 1b, we observe similar variations in firm value around the GFC for
the box plots based on a shorter window-period (2006–2009). This provides prima facie
evidence that the GFC had a negative effect on firm value and that this effect varies with
the level of leverage.
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
Figure 2 presents the cross-country differences in firm value. Of particular interest
are the variations in firm value between the periods 2003–2007 and 2008–2012, which
show that the value of firms in civil law countries (Ivory Coast, Tunisia and Morocco)
increased, while that of firms in common law countries decreased. We link this result to
differences in the level of integration with the countries where the crisis originated (the
US and UK). Thus, firms in the countries that have closer economic, legal and social ties
to the US and the UK (common law countries) were more affected than those in civil law
countries.
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
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Table 3 presents the pairwise correlations of all variables used. Firm value (Q) is
positively correlated with cash-flow, debt, market-value-to-equity (MVE) and size, while
it is negatively correlated with cash. These correlations are as expected, except for cash
which suggests that firms reduce cash holdings to finance investments.
5 Results
To test our main hypothesis (H1), we estimate Equation (1) that relates firm value to
financial conservatism (ZL, AZL and UL), a financial crisis dummy (Crisis), an interac-
tion term of financial conservatism with the financial crisis, and other control variables.
Table 4 summarises our main findings.
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
Columns (1)–(8) of Table 4 consistently show that the GFC (Crisis) has a negative
and significant effect on firm value. This result holds for both a longer (2003–2012) and
shorter (2006–2009) window-period around the GFC, and is broadly consistent with our
first hypothesis (H1) and the literature on advanced economies (see Baek et al., 2004;
Gupta et al., 2013; Enikolopov et al., 2014). We further find that the interaction term,
Crisis×FC, is positive and significant, which implies that financially conservative firms
were less affected by the credit supply shock. Our results show that the value of levered
firms decreased by 0.567 and that for zero-levered (ZL) firms increased by 0.161 (γ1 +γ2)
(in Column 2). We find similar but lower decreases of 0.155 and 0.309 for the other
measures of financial conservatism, namely almost-zero levered (AZL) firms in Column
(3) and ultra-low levered (UL) firms in Column (4), respectively. Columns (5)–(8), for
the shorter window-period (2006–2009), show similar results, with ZL firms experiencing
a moderate increase in firm value. Similarly, the value of AZL and UL firms decreased
by a small and insignificant margin.
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PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE
Figure 3 plots the estimated coefficients of Equation (1) with indicator variables for
2003–2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 interacted with the dummy for non-financially
conservative firms (NFCi). These plots indicate that levered firms (non-financially con-
servative firms (Non-FC)) experienced significant decreases in firm value from 2007 on-
wards. The decrease in firm value that we document is robust to alternative definitions
of financial conservatism (as shown in Figures 3b and 3b). These results are in line with
Table 4 and suggest that financial conservatism enhances or preserves firm value during
credit supply shocks.
We next examine the effects of the GFC across firms with different levels of debt
financing (leverage). To do this, we estimate Equation (2) augmented with three dummies
that capture differences in the level of debt financing used by the sample firms. Table 5
summarises the results for our augmented model.
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
Consistent with our predictions, the coefficient estimates of the three leverage poli-
cies (D2, D3, D4 ) in Column (1) are negative and insignificant. This suggests that the
firms have similar values before the crisis despite the differences in financing structures.
However, Column (2) shows that the estimate of the coefficients on the crisis dummy
(Crisis) and the interaction terms (Crisis×D2, Crisis×D3, and Crisis×D4 ) are signifi-
cant. Columns (3) and (4) for the shorter window-period around the GFC (2006–2009)
show similar results. This provides further supporting evidence for our first hypothe-
sis (H1) and suggests that firms with high levels of debt experienced a relatively more
pronounced decrease in firm value during the GFC.
We next examine the effects of international business exposure on the relationship
between firm value and financial conservatism (H2 and H3). We partition firms into two
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groups based on whether a firm is dual-listed (Yes) or not (No), and whether it has foreign
sales (Yes) or not (No). Table 6 summarises the estimation results for these sub-samples.
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
Panel A of Table 6 shows that dual-listed firms were more affected by the GFC than
domestic or local firms, which suggests negative spill-over effects of bonding. However,
this effect is less pronounced for financially conservative firms. This implies that financial
conservatism moderates or reduces the adverse effects of credit supply shocks on firm value
for cross-listed firms. Our results suggest that financial conservatism is a mechanism
through which firms with foreign listings can manage exposure to international business
risk, especially during periods of heightened economic uncertainty.
Similarly, we find that firms with foreign sales, in Panel B, were more affected by
the GFC relative to firms without international sales. However, the negative effect of
contractions in credit supply on the value of firms with foreign sales is less pronounced
for financially conservative firms. These results are consistent with our second (H2)
and third (H3) hypotheses. These findings suggest that even-though internationalisation
is beneficial for firms, it also inadvertently increases exposure to international market
risks and is a channel through which economic shocks are transmitted across countries.
However, as our results show, this negative effect diminishes with financial conservatism.
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE
Finally, in Table 7, we examine whether the effects of the GFC on firm value vary
with legal origin and whether financial conservatism moderates this effect. We estimate
Equation (2) that includes a dummy for civil law countries and its interaction with the
crisis and financial conservatism dummies (Crisis×Civil×FC ). The coefficient of the
Crisis dummy is consistently negative and in line with our prior results. We further
find that the coefficient of the interaction term, Crisis×Civil, is positive and significant.
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This suggest that, unlike firms in common law countries, those in civil law countries
were immune to the crisis since they are less integrated with the US and the UK where
the crisis originated. The results are consistent with Figure 2, which shows that Kenya,
Egypt, South Africa and Nigeria were adversely affected by the crisis, while the effect is
less pronounced for Ivory Coast, Tunisia and Morocco. This suggests that the effects of
the GFC vary with legal system, and countries that are more tied to the US and the UK
are more affected than others. Columns (2)–(4) further shows that the interaction terms
of financial conservatism and the crisis dummy are consistently positive and significant,
which supports Hypothesis 4 (H4). Columns (5)–(8) show similar results (for the period
2006–2009) which suggests that our findings are robust to changes in the window-period
around the GFC. Overall, the results show that financial conservatism reduces the adverse
effects of the credit supply shocks in common law countries while it enhances firm value
in civil law countries.
In summary, our results confirm the adverse effect of the GFC on firm value as reported
in the US by Duchin et al. (2010) and Almeida et al. (2011). We also show that the effect
of the GFC on firm value varies with the level of leverage and international business
exposure. Our further analyses, however, reveal that financially conservative firms and
those without international exposure were less affected by the GFC than high-levered
firms and those with international business exposure (the emerging market multinationals
(EMMNEs)). More importantly, we find that financial conservatism reduces the adverse
effect of internationalisation on firm value during the GFC. Hence, our results highlight
the significant effect of financing activities on real decisions, which becomes more apparent
during periods of heightened uncertainty, such as the GFC.
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6 Robustness
In this section, we implement a battery of robustness tests. First, we re-estimate our
baseline model of Equation (1) using market value-to-equity (MVE) and total share-
holder return (TSR) as the dependent variables. Table 8 summarises the results for these
alternative proxies of firm value.
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 8 HERE
Table 8 shows that, in all specifications, the coefficient of the crisis dummy (Crisis) is
negative and significant, but the coefficients of the interaction terms between the financial
conservatism dummy (ZL, AZL and UL, ZLL) and the crisis dummy (Crisis) are positive
and significant. This finding is consistent with our central hypothesis (H1) and implies
that firms in these countries were adversely affected by the 2008–09 credit supply shock
despite being less integrated with developed economies, and that this effect is less pro-
nounced for conservative firms. Columns (1) and (2) show the robustness of our results
to the use of alternative proxies of firm value and confirms that financial conservatism
preserves or enhances firm value during the GFC.8
Next, in Columns (3)–(8) of Table 8, we replicate the main analyses using sub-samples
for South Africa and other countries. The aim is to ensure that our results are not
mainly driven by one country (in this case South Africa). Columns (3)–(5) show that the
coefficient of the crisis dummy (Crisis) is negative and significant, which suggests that
the crisis had a similar adverse effect on firm value for firms in South Africa and other
countries as shown in the previous sections. Columns (3)–(5) show that the interaction
term, Crisis×ZL, is positive and significant, which suggests that financially conservative
firms were less affected by the credit supply shock. Columns (6)–(8) show similar results
8In unreported results, we include a set of macroeconomic control variables that may affect firm value
and find that our main conclusions do not change. This should allay concerns of other omitted variables
such as macroeconomic factors biasing our inferences.
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for firms in other countries (excluding South Africa). Based on these results, we conclude
that our baseline results are unlikely to be driven by one or a few countries in our sample.
We further conduct a robustness test where we re-estimate our baseline model across
four industrial sectors, namely Basic Materials (BM), Consumer Goods and Services
(CG&S), Health and Technology (H&T), and Industrial (IND) sectors. Consistent with
our main results, Columns (9)–(12) show that the crisis had a significant adverse effect
across all four sectors. Similarly, we find that financially conservative firms across all
sectors, except for those in the Health and Technology sectors (H&T), were less affected
by the crisis. We attribute the somewhat puzzling result for the Health and Technology
(H&T) sectors to binding financial constraints as untabulated results (available from the
authors) show that these firms are smaller and younger than their non-conservative coun-
terparts. A combination of the aforementioned characteristics in addition to operating in
a very risky sector result to the adverse effects of the crisis outweighing the benefits of fi-
nancial conservatism, thus leading to the negative overall coefficient (Crisis+Crisis×ZL).
Based on this finding, we interpret the financial conservatism that we observe for firms
in the Health and Technology (H&T) sector as externally imposed (due to binding credit
constraints) rather than being deliberate or due to internal strategic choice.
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE
Finally, we estimate a modified version of Equation (1) in which we replace the cri-
sis dummy (Crisis) and the interaction term (Crisis×FCi) with lagged corporate debt
(Debtijt−1). This enables us to directly examine how corporate debt affects firm value.
In Figure 4, we plot the coefficient of lagged corporate debt for the cross-sectional yearly
regressions of firm value while controlling for return on assets (ROA), sales growth (SG),
cash and cash equivalent (Cash), property, plant and equipment (PPE), size (Size), and
the industrial median of market value (IndMedQ). The yearly plots of the coefficients
show significant variation in the effect of corporate debt on firm value. Over the sample
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period, the negative effect of corporate debt on firm value peaks in 2006, which implies
that symptoms of the crisis were visible earlier in Africa. This negative effect dissipates
(Figure 4a) or is stable (Figure 4b) from 2006 onwards, which suggests that African firms
recovered much earlier than those in developed countries. The stable coefficient for the
restricted sample of only firms that are listed in Africa over the period 2006–2010, in
Figure 4b, further suggests that firms with operations outside Africa were more affected
than local or domestic firms. These results, as shown previously in Table 6, indicate that
cross-listing is one of the channels through which credit supply shocks are transmitted
across capital markets. Overall our robustness analyses confirm that financing policies
have a significant effect on firm value as is consistent with our main results.
7 Summary discussion and conclusion
Motivated by the ongoing debate on whether managers leave money on the table by
adopting conservative financing policies, we use a large sample of African firms and the
GFC as a quasi-natural experiment to study the effects of financial conservatism on
firm value. Specifically, we examine the effects of the GFC on firm value and how this is
moderated by financial conservatism. We then examine how the effects of the GFC and
the moderating role of financial conservatism vary across local and international firms,
and across countries with different legal systems.
Our study makes several contributions to theory and practice. First, we find robust
and significant adverse effects of the GFC on the value of publicly listed firms in emerging
markets that are less integrated with developed economies. Our further analyses show
that, relative to firms in civil law countries, the adverse effects of the GFC were more
pronounced for firms in common law countries that have stronger ties to the US and the
UK where the financial crisis originated. This provides new evidence on the far-reaching
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effects of the 2008–2009 contraction in credit supply and how ties in legal systems aid
the transmission of economic shocks across countries.
Second, we find that the adverse effect of the GFC is, however, less pronounced
for financially conservative firms, which suggests that adopting conservative financing
policies preserve firm value during crises periods. This is contrary to the mainstream
literature, which shows that using debt financing is beneficial as it increases the interest
tax shield, lowers financing costs, and mitigates the extraction of private benefits by
managers. Instead, our results suggest that such benefits associated with debt financing
may not sufficiently outweigh those arising from financial conservatism (in the form of
financial flexibility), particularly during periods of marked contractions in credit supply.
Third, we show that strategic adoption of financial conservatism is one way of effec-
tively managing risk, especially during economic downturns and for firms with exposure
to international business risk (firms with foreign sales or cross-listings). Our results sug-
gest that financial conservatism increases financial flexibility, thereby immunising firms
against credit supply shocks in both local and international capital markets. By showing
that the effects of the GFC vary with financing policies, we also provide further and more
direct evidence on the contentious nexus between financing and real corporate activities.
This also serves as a forewarning of the potential adverse effects of over-leveraging, and
the need to develop robust risk management strategies, especially given the recent surge
in corporate debt (Lund et al., 2018; Machokoto et al., 2020) and predictions of another
eminent crisis as firms appear to be taking investment risks similar to those that led to
the 2008–2009 GFC (see Syriopoulos et al., 2015; Duffie, 2019).
Finally, contrary to prior literature on the bonding hypothesis (e.g., Coffee, 2002;
Charitou and Louca, 2009; Lel and Miller, 2008; Areneke and Kimani, 2019) which doc-
uments significant positive spill-over effects on firm value, we find that bonding is not
always beneficial, especially during crises periods as it increases contagion risks. Our
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results show that firms which cross-list to gain access to external finance and benefit
from better governance systems (following on the bonding hypothesis of Coffee (2002)),
fare worse than domestic firms during the GFC, except if they are financially conser-
vative. Overall, our findings yield strong support for the moderating role of financial
conservatism on firm value during the 2008–2009 contractions in credit supply.
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Figure 1 Firm value and leverage before and during the crisis
The figure plots firm value for the four subgroups of firms over the sample periods 2003–2012 and 2006–2009. In each year,
we partition the firms into four quantiles based on leverage, namely; Low, Low-Medium, High-Medium, and High. The
central horizontal line in the box is the median while the top and bottom of the box are the 25th and 75th percentiles,
respectively. The upper and lower whiskers are the maximum and minimum values, respectively. The sample consists of
listed non-utility and non-financial firms in selected African countries drawn from Datastream over the periods 2003–2012
and 2006–2009. All variables used are defined in Table 1 and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles.
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Figure 2 Firm value by country before and during the crisis
The figure plots firm value by country (Figure 2a) and for the percentages change in firm value from the pre-crisis
(2003–2007) and crisis (2008–2012) (Figure 2b). The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms in selected
African countries drawn from Datastream over the period 2003–2012. All variables used are defined in Table 1 and are
winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles.
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Figure 3 The changes in firm value of non-financially conservative relative to
financially conservative firms.
The figures plot the coefficients estimation Equation (1) with indicator variations for 2003–2007, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012
interacted with the dummy for non-financially conservative firms. The indicator for 2008 is omitted so that the coefficients
from the regressions are interpreted as measuring the firm value are relative to that in 2008. The sample consists of listed
non-utility and non-financial firms in selected African countries drawn from Datastream over the period 2003–2012. All
variables used are defined in Table 1 and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles.
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Figure 4 The effects of leverage on firm value around the crisis
The figure plots the coefficient of leverage (sensitivity of firm value) in the cross-sectional yearly regressions of firm value,
controlling for return on assets (ROA), sales growth (SG), cash and cash equivalent (Cash), property, plant and equipment
(PPE), size (Size), and the industrial median of market value (IndMedQ). The sample consists of listed non-utility and
non-financial firms in selected African countries drawn from Datastream over the period 2003–2012. All variables used are
defined in Table 1 and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles.
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Table 1 Variable definitions
The table lists the definitions and sources of all variables used.
Variable Source Definition
Q DataStream Market of equity plus total debt-to-total assets (Firm Value (Tobin’s q)).
MVE DataStream Market of equity-to-book equity.
TSR DataStream Total shareholder return.
ZL DataStream Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has no debt, and zero
otherwise.
AZL DataStream Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has almost zero leverage
(less than or equal to 1%), and zero otherwise.
UL DataStream Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has less than 5% debt
and zero otherwise.
FC DataStream A dummy that takes the value of one for financially conservative firms and zero
otherwise.
NFC DataStream A dummy that takes the value of one for non-financially conservative firms and zero
otherwise.
D1 DataStream Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm is categorised into the first
quantile of the leverage level and zero otherwise.
D2 DataStream Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm is categorised into the second
quantile of the leverage level and zero otherwise.
D3 DataStream Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm is categorised into the third
quantile of the leverage level and zero otherwise.
D4 DataStream Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm is categorised into the fourth
quantile of the leverage level and zero otherwise.
Debt DataStream Total debt-to-total assets.
ROA DataStream Operating income-to-total assets.
SG DataStream Sales growth.
Cash DataStream Cash and equivalent-to-total assets.
Size DataStream Log of total assets.
Foreign Sales DataStream Foreign sales-to-total assets.
Dual Listing DataStream Is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm is dual-listed and
zero otherwise.
IndMedQ DataStream The industrial median firm value in each year.
IndMedMVE DataStream The industrial median MVE in each year.
IndMedTSR DataStream The industrial median TSR in each year.
Civil Country classifications into civil and common law are based on La Porta et al. (1997).
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Table 2 Basic statistics
The table summary statistics for all variables used. The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms in selected African countries drawn from Datastream
over the period 2003–2012. All variables used are defined in Table 1 and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. a, b, c, d indicate significance at the
0.01%, 1%, 5%, and 10% percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Main variables
2003–2012 2003–2007 2008–2012 Differences Kolmogorov Kruskal
Variables Mean Median Std.dev Mean Median Std.dev Mean Median Std.dev Mean Median -Smirnov -Wallis
Q 1.578 1.351 0.818 1.707 1.508 0.811 1.479 1.237 0.810 -0.228a -0.271a 0.185a 191.210a
MVE 2.248 1.728 1.723 2.566 2.043 1.767 2.002 1.475 1.647 -0.564a -0.568a 0.199a 225.758a
TSR 0.226 0.106 0.574 0.421 0.292 0.624 0.075 0.000 0.481 -0.346a -0.292a 0.272a 503.887a
TDA 0.157 0.136 0.138 0.157 0.136 0.133 0.158 0.134 0.142 0.001 -0.002 0.048b 0.769
ROA 0.168 0.165 0.134 0.178 0.174 0.147 0.161 0.158 0.123 -0.017a -0.016a 0.099a 34.135a
SG 0.104 0.086 0.198 0.107 0.089 0.186 0.102 0.085 0.206 -0.005 -0.004 0.028 0.224
Cash 0.134 0.102 0.116 0.136 0.102 0.118 0.132 0.102 0.115 -0.004 0.000 0.040d 1.114
Size 14.818 14.951 2.094 14.918 15.128 2.018 14.745 14.731 2.146 -0.173b -0.397a 0.087a 7.743b
MedQ 1.418 1.360 0.363 1.394 1.360 0.293 1.436 1.353 0.407 0.042a -0.007 0.113a 0.010
MedMVE 1.873 1.733 0.814 1.849 1.764 0.737 1.892 1.685 0.867 0.043d -0.079 0.197a 0.158
MedTSR 0.172 0.164 0.277 0.289 0.319 0.244 0.084 0.079 0.267 -0.205a -0.240a 0.400a 738.951a
N 5,230 2,279 2,951
Firms 901
Panel B: Non-financially and financially conservative firms
Q MVE TSR
# Period Non-FC ZL AZL UL Non-FC ZL AZL UL Non-FC ZL AZL UL
(1) All 1.518 2.049 1.885 1.813 2.171 2.638 2.429 2.543 0.214 0.296 0.307 0.270
(2) 2003–2007 1.659 2.039 1.868 1.852 2.547 2.744 2.476 2.623 0.430 0.376 0.410 0.393
(3) 2008–2012 1.418 2.058 1.905 1.771 1.906 2.537 2.376 2.457 0.062 0.219 0.190 0.137
N 4,157 335 580 1,073 4,157 335 580 1,073 4,157 335 580 1,073
Differences (3)–(2)
Diff-Mean -0.241a 0.019 0.037 -0.081 -0.641a -0.207 -0.100 -0.166 -0.368a -0.157b -0.220a -0.256a
Diff-Median -0.271a -0.153 -0.169 -0.177b -0.589a -0.022 -0.073 -0.344c -0.285a -0.035 -0.166b -0.210a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov 0.195a 0.116 0.104d 0.140a 0.213a 0.131 0.120c 0.148a 0.280a 0.179b 0.248a 0.239a
Kruskal-Wallis 176.559a 0.628 0.918 8.214b 212.116a 1.527 1.851 11.766a 422.640a 5.162c 22.230a 68.352a
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Table 3 Correlation
The table presents the pairwise correlations for all variables used. The sample consists of listed non-financial and non-utility firms in South Africa drawn from Datastream
over the period 2003–2012. All variables used are defined in Table 1 and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. a, b, c, d indicate significance at the
0.01%, 1%, 5%, and 10% percent levels, respectively.
# Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
(1) Q 1
(2) MVE 0.879a 1
(3) TSR 0.284a 0.279a 1
(4) ZL 0.158a 0.066a 0.036c 1
(5) AZL 0.139a 0.043b 0.052a 0.730a 1
(6) UL 0.153a 0.096a 0.038b 0.503a 0.689a 1
(7) TDA -0.198a -0.120a -0.017 -0.289a -0.393a -0.496a 1
(8) ROA 0.386a 0.281a 0.061a 0.102a 0.091a 0.113a -0.268a 1
(9) SG 0.108a 0.102a 0.033c -0.035c -0.024 -0.029d -0.027d 0.230a 1
(10) Cash 0.210a 0.136a 0.036c 0.271a 0.347a 0.315a -0.384a 0.234a 0.001 1
(11) Size 0.093a 0.141a -0.072a -0.211a -0.196a -0.137a 0.090a 0.055a 0.082a -0.212a 1
(12) MedQ 0.355a 0.347a -0.074a 0.135a 0.073a 0.136a -0.126a 0.164a 0.082a 0.072a 0.032c 1
(13) MedMVE 0.335a 0.350a -0.067a 0.112a 0.055a 0.123a -0.107a 0.178a 0.115a 0.062a 0.061a 0.953a 1
(14) MedTSR 0.215a 0.234a 0.129a 0.019 0.039b 0.058a -0.070a 0.139a 0.073a 0.082a 0.008 0.417a 0.399a 1
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Table 4 The effects of financial conservatism on firm value
The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1) that relates the firm value (Q) to the crisis dummy (Crisis),
financial conservatism dummy (ZL, AZL and UL) and firm-specific variables. The sample consists of listed non-utility and
non-financial firms in selected African countries drawn from Datastream over the period 2003–2012. All variables used are
defined in Table 1 and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. a, b, c, d indicate significance at the 0.01%,
1%, 5%, and 10% percent levels, respectively.
2003–2012 2006–2009
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 2.296a 2.130a 2.133a 2.015a 10.808a 10.125a 10.386a 10.290a
(0.591) (0.566) (0.566) (0.583) (1.084) (1.050) (1.068) (1.080)
Crisis -0.513a -0.567a -0.573a -0.585a -0.431a -0.495a -0.493a -0.493a
(0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.043) (0.039) (0.041) (0.044)
Crisis×ZL 0.728a 0.608a
(0.152) (0.141)
Crisis×AZL 0.418a 0.352a
(0.097) (0.103)
Crisis×UL 0.276a 0.203b
(0.069) (0.076)
ROA 0.979a 0.925a 0.923a 0.959a 0.434c 0.278 0.316 0.343
(0.084) (0.077) (0.080) (0.080) (0.202) (0.198) (0.207) (0.213)
SG 0.131a 0.121a 0.131a 0.136a 0.119 0.096 0.121 0.129
(0.039) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.089) (0.087) (0.088) (0.089)
Cash 1.006a 0.944a 0.982a 1.012a 1.371a 1.331a 1.398a 1.422a
(0.144) (0.154) (0.151) (0.149) (0.265) (0.264) (0.265) (0.265)
Size -0.083c -0.062d -0.067d -0.060 -0.626a -0.573a -0.593a -0.589a
(0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.073) (0.070) (0.072) (0.073)
IndMedian 0.360a 0.295a 0.328a 0.330a 0.081 0.042 0.051 0.069
(0.051) (0.045) (0.048) (0.048) (0.073) (0.067) (0.068) (0.070)
N 4,669 4,669 4,669 4,669 1,896 1,896 1,896 1,896
Firms 901 901 901 901 678 678 678 678
R2 0.27 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.29
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Table 5 The effects of leverage policies on firm value
The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1) that relates the firm value (Q) to the crisis dummy (Crisis),
leverage policy dummies (D2, D3, and D4) and firm-specific variables. The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-
financial firms in selected African countries drawn from Datastream over the periods 2003–2012 and 2006–2009. All variables
used are defined in Table 1 and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. a, b, c, d indicate significance at the
0.01%, 1%, 5%, and 10% percent levels, respectively.
2003–2012 2006–2009
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 1.968a 2.005a 10.161a 9.949a
(0.569) (0.588) (1.073) (1.091)
D2 -0.021 0.027 -0.095 -0.035
(0.038) (0.050) (0.062) (0.081)
D3 -0.034 0.072 -0.168c -0.065
(0.043) (0.058) (0.072) (0.080)
D4 -0.089d 0.016 -0.180c -0.107
(0.048) (0.062) (0.083) (0.097)
Crisis -0.159c -0.341a
(0.067) (0.079)
Crisis×D2 -0.090 -0.098
(0.059) (0.083)
Crisis×D3 -0.202b -0.197c
(0.062) (0.095)
Crisis×D4 -0.199b -0.145d
(0.063) (0.086)
ROA 0.982a 0.945a 0.423c 0.285
(0.084) (0.081) (0.204) (0.228)
SG 0.130a 0.131a 0.129 0.122
(0.038) (0.038) (0.089) (0.087)
Cash 0.978a 0.961a 1.329a 1.331a
(0.145) (0.150) (0.267) (0.276)
Size -0.077c -0.063 -0.604a -0.561a
(0.038) (0.038) (0.071) (0.073)
IndMedian 0.364a 0.350a 0.083 0.077
(0.051) (0.049) (0.073) (0.071)
N 4,669 4,669 1,896 1,896
Firms 901 901 678 678
R2 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.29
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Table 6 Internationalisation, financial conservatism and firm value
The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1) that relates the firm value (Q) to the crisis dummy (Crisis),
financial conservatism dummy (ZL, AZL and UL) and firm-specific variables. Figure (a) includes all firms while Figure (b)
is for the restricted sample excluding firms not listed or headquartered in Africa. The sample consists of listed non-utility
and non-financial firms in selected African countries drawn from Datastream over the period 2003–2012. All variables used
are defined in Table 1 and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. a, b, c, d indicate significance at the
0.01%, 1%, 5%, and 10% percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Dual Listing
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 2.640b 1.867c 2.399b 1.996c 2.464b 1.769c 2.496b 1.530d
(0.825) (0.815) (0.793) (0.780) (0.791) (0.783) (0.818) (0.816)
Crisis -0.391a -0.664a -0.440a -0.721a -0.447a -0.725a -0.429a -0.756a
(0.056) (0.050) (0.057) (0.051) (0.056) (0.049) (0.057) (0.051)
Crisis×ZL 0.493b 1.196a
(0.186) (0.105)
Crisis×AZL 0.329c 0.524a
(0.128) (0.143)
Crisis×UL 0.128 0.414a
(0.095) (0.094)
ROA 1.022a 0.923a 0.996a 0.830a 0.987a 0.849a 1.011a 0.903a
(0.144) (0.102) (0.139) (0.087) (0.142) (0.094) (0.143) (0.094)
SG 0.102c 0.176b 0.093d 0.165b 0.098c 0.182b 0.103c 0.186b
(0.052) (0.058) (0.049) (0.053) (0.050) (0.056) (0.051) (0.056)
Cash 0.746a 1.381a 0.678a 1.351a 0.715a 1.373a 0.754a 1.368a
(0.190) (0.209) (0.201) (0.207) (0.198) (0.212) (0.193) (0.214)
Size -0.098d -0.076 -0.075 -0.068 -0.082 -0.062 -0.086 -0.046
(0.057) (0.051) (0.054) (0.049) (0.054) (0.049) (0.056) (0.052)
IndMedian 0.220a 0.606a 0.184a 0.475a 0.200a 0.555a 0.210a 0.542a
(0.056) (0.084) (0.051) (0.086) (0.054) (0.084) (0.055) (0.081)
N 2,371 2,298 2,371 2,298 2,371 2,298 2,371 2,298
Firms 515 386 515 386 515 386 515 386
R2 0.23 0.33 0.25 0.37 0.24 0.35 0.23 0.35
Panel B: Foreign Sales
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 2.523a 1.319 2.213a 1.405 2.267a 1.423 2.319a 1.744d
(0.655) (0.932) (0.633) (0.915) (0.633) (0.916) (0.658) (0.911)
Crisis -0.387a -0.794a -0.454a -0.838a -0.452a -0.858a -0.429a -0.872a
(0.048) (0.070) (0.048) (0.072) (0.048) (0.062) (0.051) (0.063)
Crisis×ZL 0.639a 0.855a
(0.179) (0.209)
Crisis×AZL 0.321b 0.773b
(0.102) (0.251)
Crisis×UL 0.120 0.681a
(0.075) (0.167)
ROA 0.843a 1.277a 0.840a 1.177a 0.822a 1.168a 0.841a 1.138a
(0.101) (0.130) (0.099) (0.115) (0.101) (0.115) (0.102) (0.111)
SG 0.087c 0.264a 0.075d 0.253a 0.085c 0.259a 0.088c 0.267a
(0.042) (0.066) (0.040) (0.063) (0.041) (0.063) (0.042) (0.063)
Cash 0.675a 1.480a 0.605a 1.412a 0.662a 1.428a 0.691a 1.434a
(0.157) (0.278) (0.172) (0.268) (0.163) (0.268) (0.158) (0.277)
Size -0.099c -0.054 -0.067 -0.058 -0.076d -0.058 -0.082d -0.069
(0.048) (0.055) (0.046) (0.054) (0.046) (0.054) (0.048) (0.054)
IndMedian 0.264a 0.752a 0.202a 0.761a 0.243a 0.754a 0.256a 0.668a
(0.046) (0.167) (0.036) (0.166) (0.040) (0.161) (0.043) (0.164)
N 2,720 1,949 2,720 1,949 2,720 1,949 2,720 1,949
Firms 675 354 675 354 675 354 675 354
R2 0.23 0.35 0.26 0.36 0.24 0.37 0.23 0.38
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Table 7 Legal origin, financial conservatism and firm value
The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1) that relates the firm value (Q) to the crisis dummy (Crisis),
financial conservatism dummy (ZL, AZL and UL), civil law dummy (Civil), and firm-specific variables. The sample consists
of listed non-utility and non-financial firms in selected African countries drawn from Datastream over the periods 2003–2012
and 2006–2009. All variables used are defined in Table 1 and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. a, b,
c, d indicate significance at the 0.01%, 1%, 5%, and 10% percent levels, respectively.
2003–2012 2006–2009
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 2.344a 2.182a 2.189a 2.087a 10.623a 10.197a 10.356a 10.280a
(0.591) (0.569) (0.570) (0.585) (1.076) (1.045) (1.063) (1.067)
Crisis -0.544a -0.574a -0.582a -0.597a -0.473a -0.504a -0.506a -0.509a
(0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) (0.043)
Crisis×Civil 0.909a 0.370a 0.374a 0.387a 0.832a 0.412a 0.414a 0.417a
(0.128) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.114) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093)
Crisis×ZL 0.586b 0.412c
(0.179) (0.175)
Crisis×Civil×ZL 0.259 0.233
(0.244) (0.229)
Crisis×AZL 0.322b 0.214c
(0.100) (0.108)
Crisis×Civil×AZL 0.515b 0.431c
(0.191) (0.185)
Crisis×UL 0.224b 0.121
(0.070) (0.076)
Crisis×Civil×UL 0.618a 0.521b
(0.178) (0.168)
ROA 0.975a 0.933a 0.932a 0.957a 0.411c 0.309 0.336 0.350
(0.084) (0.078) (0.081) (0.080) (0.201) (0.204) (0.209) (0.214)
SG 0.126a 0.121a 0.129a 0.133a 0.118 0.105 0.125 0.130
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.088) (0.086) (0.088) (0.089)
Cash 1.006a 0.959a 0.992a 1.016a 1.306a 1.298a 1.329a 1.338a
(0.144) (0.150) (0.148) (0.148) (0.266) (0.264) (0.266) (0.265)
Size -0.082c -0.065d -0.067d -0.060 -0.611a -0.578a -0.589a -0.585a
(0.039) (0.037) (0.038) (0.039) (0.073) (0.070) (0.072) (0.072)
IndMedian 0.322a 0.281a 0.298a 0.294a 0.066 0.040 0.043 0.052
(0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.066) (0.067) (0.067) (0.067)
N 4,669 4,669 4,669 4,669 1,896 1,896 1,896 1,896
Firms 901 901 901 901 678 678 678 678
R2 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32
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Table 8 Alternative sub-samples and definitions of firm value
The table presents the estimation results of Equation (1) that relates the firm value to the crisis dummy (Crisis), financial conservatism dummy (ZL) and firm-specific
variables. The three alternative measures of firm value are firm value (Q), the market value-to-equity (MVE) and total shareholder return (TSR). Columns (1) and (2)
includes all firms, while Columns (3)–(5) is for firms in South Africa and Columns (6)–(8) is for firms from other countries (excluding South Africa). Column (9) is for
firms in the Basic Materials (BM) sector. Column (10) is for firms in the Consumer Goods and Services (CG&S) sectors. Column (11) is for firms in the Health and
Technology (H&T) sectors. Column (12) is for firms in the Industrial (IND) sector. The sample consists of listed non-utility and non-financial firms in selected African
countries drawn from Datastream over the period 2003–2012. All variables used are defined in Table 1 and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. a, b, c,
d indicate significance at the 0.01%, 1%, 5%, and 10% percent levels, respectively.
Sectorial Analysis
All firms South Africa Other Countries BM CG&S H&T IND
MVE TSR Q MVE TSR Q MVE TSR Q
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Constant 4.877a 4.991a 1.687b 3.792b 5.449a 1.667 4.521 5.182b 3.943a -2.291 1.914 4.701a
(1.137) (0.698) (0.585) (1.190) (0.774) (1.773) (3.713) (1.675) (1.073) (1.450) (1.396) (0.662)
Crisis -0.802a -0.249a -0.713a -0.622a -0.228a -0.357a -0.771a -0.326a -0.689a -0.437a -0.530a -0.558a
(0.088) (0.037) (0.044) (0.138) (0.042) (0.097) (0.160) (0.076) (0.082) (0.087) (0.140) (0.051)
Crisis×ZL 1.136a 0.328a 0.384d 0.424d 0.258a 0.981a 1.543a 0.248c 1.697a 0.338d -0.316b 0.527a
(0.228) (0.048) (0.197) (0.221) (0.044) (0.214) (0.329) (0.096) (0.236) (0.174) (0.115) (0.135)
ROA 1.627a -0.489a 0.890a 1.610a -0.423a 1.216b 1.400 -0.462 0.417a 2.238a 1.518a 0.994a
(0.177) (0.098) (0.078) (0.184) (0.098) (0.417) (0.900) (0.339) (0.053) (0.331) (0.412) (0.214)
SG 0.284a 0.120c 0.119b 0.302a 0.099d 0.214d 0.240 0.288c 0.207b 0.031 -0.148 0.152b
(0.073) (0.050) (0.039) (0.077) (0.054) (0.115) (0.223) (0.123) (0.068) (0.123) (0.130) (0.050)
Cash 1.599a 0.144 1.108a 1.910a 0.219 0.177 0.545 -0.061 1.365a 0.646d 0.562d 0.904a
(0.308) (0.134) (0.154) (0.326) (0.150) (0.353) (0.724) (0.305) (0.198) (0.345) (0.299) (0.196)
Size -0.190c -0.303a -0.064d -0.151d -0.328a -0.016 -0.172 -0.341b -0.141c 0.240c -0.057 -0.231a
(0.076) (0.047) (0.037) (0.078) (0.051) (0.127) (0.266) (0.121) (0.067) (0.097) (0.112) (0.044)
IndMedian 0.222a -0.017 0.603a 0.468a -0.040 0.092c 0.074d -0.266a 0.153b 0.143 0.237 0.149c
(0.041) (0.046) (0.100) (0.098) (0.055) (0.045) (0.043) (0.067) (0.059) (0.096) (0.239) (0.064)
N 4,669 4,669 3,647 3,647 3,647 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,367 1,333 377 1,592
Firms 901 901 647 647 647 254 254 254 261 259 71 310
R2 0.26 0.15 0.36 0.31 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.41 0.30 0.37 0.40
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